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Abstract 
We introduce a new model for optimal internal capital allocation, which would allow banks to 
maximize their Return on Risk-Adjusted Capital (RORAC) under regulatory and capital 
constraints. We extend the single period model of Buch et al. (2011) to a multi-period model 
and improve its forecasting accuracy by including the debt effect and Bayesian learning 
innovations. The empirical application shows that our model significantly improves the 
RORAC of a sample of banks listed in the S&P 500 index. 
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It is well established in the extant literature that allocation of risk capital is critical for 
measuring the financial performance and risk-return optimization in banks (Buch et al., 2011). 
Risk capital is the equity capital required to safeguard the commitments to creditors, customers 
and contract counterparties (Erel et al., 2015). Banks need to maintain the required risk capital 
because they deal in credit-sensitive assets and liabilities. Hence, the creditworthiness of banks 
is crucial to their ability to write many types of contracts (Perold, 2005). For banks, efficient 
allocation of risk capital to sub-businesses is a key for ensuring a favorable risk-return trade-
off. Risk capital is costly and therefore it must be efficiently allocated for investment (Erel et 
al., 2015) and for managing market, operational and credit risks (Embrechts et al., 2003; 
Alessandri and Drehmann, 2010; Breuer et al., 2010; Rosen and Saunders, 2010). We introduce 
a closed-form solution for optimal capital allocation in order to maximize the Return on Risk-
adjusted Capital (RORAC). Our work extends Buch et al.’s (2011) single period model to a 
multi-period setting and makes several improvements. The newly developed multi-period risk 
capital allocation model is then empirically tested using data from a sample of banks listed in 
the S&P 500 index. 
In theory, it is assumed that markets are frictionless and informationally efficient and a 
manger’s task is to simply distribute the required funds to the divisions, treating each of them 
as autonomous entities. In practice, however, the capital allocation process in banks is quite 
challenging, as different business units compete with one another for securing capital allocation 
from the headquarters. Therefore, efficient allocation of capital is one of the key features of the 
capital budgeting process in banks (Stoughton and Zechner, 2007). The existing literature is 
mostly theoretical and provides only limited guidance on how to best allocate capital to 
multiple divisions in the presence of asymmetric information and capital constraints. As far as 
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we are aware, no study has provided evidence of empirical performance of theoretically derived 
capital allocation models for banks with multiple divisions. 
Previous research has used different notions of risk capital. Merton and Perold (1993) 
define risk capital as the smallest amount that can be invested to insure the value of the firm's 
net assets against a loss in value relative to a risk-free investment. They consider risk capital 
as the value of a put option on the US Treasury Bonds. They find that risk capital is uniquely 
determined by the net assets’ riskiness and its full allocation can distort the true profitability of 
individual businesses. On the other hand, Perold (2005) uses the VaR and Adjusted Net Present 
Value (APV) as risk and profit measures respectively for capital allocation process assuming 
normally distributed returns. His model predicts that opaque financial firms will diversify 
across businesses which will reduce the cost of risk capital and create more profitable 
investment opportunities.   
Despite a thorough scrutiny of technical aspects of risk capital allocation in the existing 
literature, the economic rationale for capital allocation is still being debated. Some argue that 
capital allocation is essential for monitoring performance of business units by controlling risks 
ex ante (Buch et al., 2011). Others argue that firms should not use capital allocation as it is a 
useless exercise (Gründl and Schmeiser, 2007). Stoughton and Zechner (2007) are the first to 
show that optimization of capital allocation pursued via Economic Value Added (EVA) at the 
headquarters is consistent with maximization of EVA of the allocated capital at the business 
unit level. They find that divisions with increasing (decreasing) outside managerial 
opportunities tend to have lower (higher) information asymmetry requiring lower (higher) 
capital charge and over (under)-invest in risky projects. Whilst their model incorporates 
asymmetric information and outside managerial opportunities, it relies on only very specific 




There is research that examines risk capital allocation in the insurance industry where 
the aim is to minimize losses. For example, Myers and Read (2001) use the option pricing 
method to allocate capital based on the marginal contribution of each business unit to the 
overall option based default value. They find that marginal contribution to default risk vary 
across the business lines. While their model is restricted under continuous state lognormal and 
normal loss distribution, Sherris (2006) generalizes their model to make it applicable under any 
loss distribution assumptions under risk neutral probability. He shows how the management 
allocates capital to business lines using the insolvency exchange option value by ranking of 
outstanding claim payments in the event of insolvency. Kim and Hardy (2009) further extend 
Sherris’s (2006) model by using limited liability of the shareholders under real world 
probability measure that is applied in an incomplete market setting. They argue that it is the 
owners of the company, not the line managers, who determine the capital allocation. Furman 
and Zitikis (2008) take a different allocation approach where the weighted risk capital 
allocation is based on weighted premium calculation principle that is well suited for insurance 
pricing. They calculate the weighted premium using weighted loss distribution derived from 
the weight function that is deterministic, non-negative and Borel-measurable. They find that 
their model can capture many risk capital allocation approaches, which are special cases of 
their weighted allocation model. Dhaene et al. (2012) propose a generalized risk capital 
allocation model that can account for a variety of risk measures and allocation principles. Their 
model attempts to minimize the weighted sums of the deviations of business unit’s losses with 
respect to their allocated capital. Erel et al. (2015) improve Myers and Read’s (2001) model by 
extending it to other types of financial firms. They use marginal default value, adjusted present 
value (APV) and credit quality measured by the ratio of firm’s default option to default free 
value of its liabilities for allocating capital to business units for the maximization of firm value. 
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Capital allocation problem has also been a topic of interest in the realm of mathematical 
finance. For example, Denault (2001) introduces the allocation principle by using the gradient 
allocation (i.e., Euler allocation) method that allocates capital according to each entity’s 
relative contribution to the overall risk. He tests his model under two different settings. One in 
which a firm is considered indivisible (coalitional game setting) and the other where a firm is 
considered divisible (fractional players game setting). He finds the his capital allocation model 
works better under fractional players game setting because it requires less restrictive conditions 
on the risk measure used. Tasche (2004) uses the same approach but extends Euler allocation 
such that more capital is allocated if a business unit generates above average risk-adjusted 
returns. On the other hand, Kalkbrener (2005) proposes an axiomatic approach to capital 
allocation with three principles: linear aggregation, diversification and continuity 1. He argues 
that in contrast to Value-at-Risk (VaR), Expected Shortfall (ES) and risk measures based on 
standard deviations are subadditive and positively homogeneous. He shows that for these two 
classes, it is possible to derive explicit formulae, which specify linear, diversifying capital 
allocations.  
Buch et al. (2011) argue that the Euler allocation method is suboptimal as it can lead to 
over expansion or reduction of business lines resulting in the overall decline of RORAC. They 
introduce an additional risk correction term that considers the risk interdependencies among 
the business lines and maximizes the overall RORAC without over-expansion or over-
reduction as in Tasche (2004). However, Buch et al.’s (2011) model is limited to single period 
                                                            
1 Kalkbrener (2005)’s three allocation axioms are: 
• Linear aggregation: the risk capital of portfolio equals the sum of the risk capital of its sub-portfolios. 
• Diversification: the risk capital of the sub-portfolio does not exceed the risk capital of the stand-alone 
portfolio. 
• Continuity: small changes in the portfolio have limited effect on the risk capital of its sub-portfolio. 
6 
 
and only considers static expected profit and risk. Given these limitations, their model cannot 
be empirically tested in a multi-period setting.  
We make several important contributions to the existing literature. First, we extend 
Buch et al.’s (2011) single period model to a multi-period model thus enhancing its practical 
utility. Second, we allow more capital to be allocated to those business units that have higher 
debt but are profitable. Third, we incorporate the influence of managerial decisions in capital 
allocation via the Bayesian learning process. Finally, we also provide an empirical test of our 
theoretical model using both risk and regulatory capital constraints.       
In terms of the theory, our model minimizes the impact of information asymmetry. This 
is achieved through the Bayesian learning process that recalculates the optimal capital for 
allocation over time by including the accumulated difference between the expected profit 
before allocation and the actual profit after allocation. Our model also considers the debt effect, 
something that has been ignored in the extant literature. The debt effect recalculates the optimal 
capital that could be allocated to divisions with relatively higher proportion of debt. In terms 
of practical contributions, we are the first to offer empirical evidence of shareholder value 
effects of capital allocation by considering both risk and regulatory capital. Our paper has 
significant implications for both the existing theory and practice of capital allocation in banks. 
We show that our multi-period capital allocation model can be empirically applied while 
ensuring that the regulatory capital requirements are met. Additionally, we also examine our 
model’s capital allocation efficiency using the required risk/economic capital which is 
calculated using the ES measure. 
We empirically test our capital allocation model by using data of fourteen U.S. banks 
from the S&P500 index over the period 2006 to 2014. Our results show that the average 
RORAC improves by 0.305 percentage points per quarter when using regulatory capital (under 
Basel+ regime) and by 0.331 percentage points when risk capital is used (under Economic 
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Capital+ regime) 2. Further, we find that improvement in the RORAC is greater for large banks. 
Overall, we show that our model improves the RORAC of the banks in our sample.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our model development 
process. Section 3 explains the data and the empirical approach. Section 4 presents results, and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Model Development  
Our starting point is the model for optimal risk capital allocation proposed by Buch et al. (2011) 
that aims to maximise a firm’s overall return-to-risk measured by RORAC.3 They use the Euler 
principle to allocate risk capital according to each business unit’s marginal RORAC. The 
marginal RORAC is the partial derivative of the overall RORAC with respect to each business 
unit’s risk capital.4 It describes the marginal effect of the business unit on the firm’s overall 
RORAC. The decision rule is to expand or contract a business unit by allocating more or less 
risk capital. For example, a bank would expand a business unit by allocating more capital if its 
marginal RORAC before capital allocation is greater than the overall RORAC, until the 
marginal RORAC is the same as the overall RORAC. However, the model does not consider 
creation of new business units or closure of the existing ones.5 
                                                            
2 In our work, when we internally allocate regulatory or risk capital we call it Basel or Economic Capital regime, 
respectively. Furthermore, when we incorporate debt effect and the Bayesian learning process in our model, we 
call it Basel+ or Economic Capital+ regime, respectively. 
3 RORAC is the expected profit over the allocated risk-adjusted capital. Buch et al. (2011) argue that their model 
is also applicable when Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC) and Risk-Adjusted Return on Risk Adjusted 
Capital (RARORAC) are used. 
4 The business unit in our work means a division. We use these two terms interchangeably throughout the paper. 
5 The headquarters calculates the optimal capital to be allocated based on the overall risk of the portfolio made up 
of different business units. 
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Buch et al.’s (2011) allocation of capital to sub-businesses is based on two assumptions. 
First, the risk measure should be a homogeneous function6 in order to be differentiable. Second, 
managers have superior knowledge about the financial implications of expansion and 
contraction of their business units. Buch et al. (2011) acknowledge that their model is not a 
multi-period model since the expected profit, risk and capital are not time varying. Moreover, 
their model does not consider the debt effect and information asymmetry.  
Our work extends Buch et al.’s (2011) single period model by relaxing their 
assumptions and by incorporating the debt effect to account for higher debt and the Bayesian 
learning process to minimise the errors arising from inaccuracies in estimating the next period’s 
return on capital. Further, for calculating RORAC, we use both regulatory and risk capital.  Our 
model calculates the optimal capital weights to be assigned to each business unit at time t. We 
then use these optimal capital weights at time t to calculate the corresponding RORAC in the 
next period (t+△t) using the new ROC and total capital in this period (t+△t) which are 
unknown at time t and reflect the forecasting uncertainty. Further, we do not allow any external 
capital injection and reallocate only the existing capital among the business units.   
 
2.1. Optimal Capital Allocation Model 
2.1.1. Time-Varying Risk Measurement  
Definition 2.1. We follow Lönnbark (2013) and develop a time-varying risk measure by using 
one-step-ahead ES 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 . 7 Specifically, we use the absolute risk measure of the one-step-ahead 
ES by assuming that the expected profit is zero. This eliminates the possibility of negative 
                                                            
6 A function f such that all points (x1, …..., xn) in its domain of definition and all real t>0, the equation 
  f(tx1, ….., txn) = 𝑡𝑡λf(x1, ….., xn) holds, where λ is a real number (Kudryavtsev, 2002).  
7 ES is a measure of the average of all potential losses exceeding the VaR at a given confidence level. The Basel 
committee advocates using ES over VaR as a measure of risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013). 
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Economic Capital.   
                            𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤] =
𝜙𝜙(Φ𝛼𝛼−1)
𝛼𝛼
× �𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 × σ𝑡𝑡cov × 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
′
�������������
Square root of weighted conditional covariance
                                  (1)        
N is the number of business units, 𝑢𝑢i,t and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  (=
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
) are the capital amount and weight 
of business unit i  (where i=1, ⋯, N) at time t, respectively. 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 is a (1 × N) vector with elements 
of capital weights 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  of all business units at time t. 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
′ is a transpose of the vector 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤.  𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤] 
is the ES dependent on capital weight 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 with confidence interval (1 − 𝛼𝛼) at time t. Φ𝛼𝛼−1 is an 
inverse of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) (i.e., quantile function) of normal 
distribution evaluated a the confidence level (1 − 𝛼𝛼). We use 97.5% confidence level, which 
is the BIS suggested requirement for the ES. 𝜙𝜙(•) is the probability density function (PDF) of 
standard normal distribution. σ𝑡𝑡cov is the square root of the conditional covariance at time t 
using all business units’ (i=1, ⋯, N) return on capital (ROC) in a (N × N) matrix form. 
Our one-step-ahead ES measure captures the time varying ROC and the capital to 
estimate risk in a dynamic manner. The weight feature of the realized covariance matrix allows 
estimating the dynamic risk arising not only from the correlation among the business units but 
also from their relative weights where each business unit’s value itself is time varying. The 
model assumes normally distributed risk as shown in 𝜙𝜙(•) and Φ𝛼𝛼−1.  
 
2.1.2. Time-Varying Expected Profit Process 
Definition 2.2. We assume the time-varying expected profit process follows a Stochastic 
Differential Equation (SDE):8 
                                                            
8 The SDE is a time-varying version of the stochastic profit process used by Buch et al. (2011). However, its drift 
parameter is non-time varying. 
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                                       (2)                        
The profit for business unit i at time t is its expected profit plus profit fluctuations, where both 
the drift 𝜇𝜇 and the diffusion 𝜎𝜎 are time varying. 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 is the standard Wiener process. All business 
units within a firm follow this SDE process. Instead of calculating the time-varying drift 
parameter 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡] itself, we indirectly measure this through discretization as shown in our 
proof of lemma 2.3 of the appendix.  
 
2.1.3. The Closed-Form Solution  
We derive a closed-form solution for optimal internal capital allocation by implementing our 
time-varying risk measure (definition 2.1) and expected profit (definition 2.2) into the 
following equation (3) which equates marginal RORAC and overall RORAC.  
                                            𝑟𝑟[𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 |𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 ]�����
Marginal RORAC with




                                     (3) 
We consider weights of capital, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  (additional capital weight) and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  (existing capital 
weight), while allowing the total capital to vary over time. In other words, our model reallocates 
the existing total capital amount among the business units to maximize the overall RORAC. 
The additional capital weight 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  is optimal when it satisfies equation (3) which maximizes 
bank’s overall RORAC. Therefore, we express the 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  in equation (3) which includes the time-
varying risk and expected profit measures. The derivation process is provided in our proof of 
lemma 2.3 of the appendix. 
Lemma 2.3. We develop a closed from solution as follows: 








𝑤𝑤 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is the risk contribution of business unit i at time t, 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤] is the time-varying risk 
measure (i.e., one-step ahead ES) using capital weight 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 as the input and Λ𝑡𝑡 is the maximum 
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𝑤𝑤  with the business units’ capital weights 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 .  
        In our model, the capital is allocated to (subtracted from) division i when the marginal 
RORAC of division i is greater (less) than the overall RORAC. The additional capital weight 
to business unit i, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 , which equates its marginal RORAC to the overall RORAC is considered 
as optimal since it maximizes the overall RORAC as shown in equation (3). The closed-form 
solution for the optimal capital weight  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  in equation (4) is deduced from this relationship in 
equation (3). The closed-form solution in equation (4) shows that the optimal capital allocation 
to a business unit i decreases with its risk contribution 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  but increases with the overall risk 
𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤] at time t. Furthermore, when the maximum directional strength 𝛬𝛬𝑡𝑡 (i.e., the effect of 
the magnitude of capital allocation on the overall RORAC) from additional capital input is 
large (small), less (more) capital is allocated. Another innovation we make in our model is that 
we consider ex-ante ROC. We estimate the optimal capital weight for each division for the next 
period under the conditions when the ROC and total capital are unknown.         
Definition 2.4. We add the self-evolving existing capital weight  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  to the additional capital 
weight 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤   derived from our closed-form solution in lemma 2.3 to produce the new capital 
weight 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1𝑤𝑤 . 
                                                         𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1𝑤𝑤 = 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 +  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤                                                     (5) 
Equation (5) shows that we add the optimal capital weight  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  from equation (4) to the existing 
capital weight 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  to derive the new capital weight 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1𝑤𝑤  for division i at time t+1. We use 
the new capital weight 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1𝑤𝑤  to calculate the overall RORAC at time t+1 when the ROC 
and total capital are unknown. 
 
2.2. Optimal Allocation Under Constraints 
The above closed form solution (equation 5) has two shortcomings. First, the additional capital 
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weight  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤   does not necessarily sum to zero. This implies that at every iteration, there will be 
either capital injection or reduction. Second, the new capital weight  𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1𝑤𝑤  can be negative 
which would suggest a short position in one or more business units. However, this is not 
possible in practice. With an aim to overcome these challenges, we optimize a firm’s return-
to-risk ratio by reallocating the existing capital while not allowing negative capital for any 
business unit. We re-inject any negative capital values back into our model within the same 
allocation period until we derive non-negative capital values. To ensure no change in the total 
capital, we require the capital weights 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1𝑤𝑤  to always sum up to one.9  
 
2.3. Debt Effect 
In our model, we consider risk that may be incurred due to excessive debt at the divisional 
level. For this purpose, we calculate the relative debt amount of division i, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, compared to 




add this to the new capital weights in equation (5) to produce the updated new capital weight 
with debt effect, 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1𝑤𝑤 . 
              𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1𝑤𝑤�����








 +      𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤�
debt effect
          (6) 
The debt effect enables our model to provide more capital to a division with relatively high 
debt compared to the overall firm. Thus, our model considers the risk arising from excessive 
debt at the divisional level.  
 
                                                            




2.4. Bayesian Learning  
In order to improve the forecasting accuracy, we incorporate the Bayesian learning process in 
our model. It minimizes forecasting errors that arise from the information asymmetry between 
the ‘belief’ about the expected profit after capital allocation and the actual profit before the 
capital allocation. As the ROC of next period is unknown, this may cause a significant 
forecasting error leading to inaccurate optimal capital weights for RORAC maximization. The 
forecasting error may increase significantly if there is a large information asymmetry between 
the ‘belief’ and ‘actual’ ROC of the next period that Buch et al. (2011) have not considered. 
Our Bayesian learning process considers historic ROCs’ over time to update the ‘belief’ about 
the next period’s ROCs and the corresponding expected profits after capital allocation. As a 
result, the forecasting error arising from the difference between the ‘belief’ and ‘actual’   profits 
for the next period is minimized through this accumulated learning process. This leads to an 
enhanced optimal capital allocation for RORAC maximization.  
Lemma 2.5. The closed-form solution for optimal capital weight reflecting the Bayesian 
learning process is as follows.      
                         𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 =
−𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡






                    (7) 
 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  is the new optimal capital weight of division i at time t reflecting the Bayesian learning 
process. The divisional capital weights before and after capital allocation are  𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  
and 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 , respectively. The integral part of equation (7) accumulates the difference between 
the actual and expected profit over time, scaled by ES risk measure 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 . The proof for this 
definition is provided in our proof of lemma 2.5 of the appendix. 
 
3. Data and Method  
We use data for selected U.S. banks from the S&P 500 index as of December 31, 2014 based 
on the following criteria: 
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(1) Bank has more than one business unit 
(2) Bank has published financial statements with information regarding the 
regulatory capital 
(3) Bank has published financial statements which provide asset and net 
income data at the business unit level 
Fourteen U.S. banks met these criteria. Quarterly data were collected from Bloomberg, starting 
with the most recent quarter for each bank going back to the year when the business units of 
each bank as of December 31, 2014 were still operational.   
 
3.1. Risk and Regulatory Capital  
3.1.1. Regulatory Capital 
Regulatory capital that we consider in our paper is the capital required by banks to maintain a 
minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8% between the total capital (i.e. Tier 1 capital + Tier 2 
capital) and risk-weighted assets (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988). A revised 
capital adequacy framework in June 2004 was released under Basel II which retains the capital 
adequacy ratio of 8%, however, three new pillars were added (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2015). The first pillar considered operational risk in addition to the credit and 
market risks in quantifying risk more precisely for the purpose of calculating the minimum 
capital requirement. The second pillar requires banks to use internal risk assessment measures 
that includes pension risk and goodwill risk. The third pillar requires banks to report the risk 
and capital structure of banks (Wernz, 2014). Basel III released in 2010 revises and strengthens 
the three pillars laid out in Basel II. It reflects the Basel Committee's response to the global 
financial crisis by addressing a number of shortcomings in the pre-crisis regulatory framework. 
Basel III provides a foundation for a resilient banking system to avoid the systemic 
vulnerabilities. It aims at improving the quality of bank regulatory capital by placing a greater 
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focus on going-concern loss-absorbing capital in the form of Common Equity Tier 1 capital to 
ensure that banks are sufficiently resilient to withstand losses in times of stress. Additionally, 
Basel III also requires a minimum leverage ratio to constrain excess leverage in the banking 
system and complement the risk-weighted capital requirements (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2010a, 2010b).   
 
3.1.2. Risk/Economic Capital 
We define Risk/Economic capital as the minimum capital needed to ensure that a bank could 
survive insolvency resulting from an unexpected loss (Zaik et al., 1996). Since we use ES as a 
measure of risk, our empirical tests reflect not only the regulatory requirements of Basel II and 
III but also to some extent, the capital adequacy norms as laid down under the Internal Capital 
Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP).10 In addition to the quantitative capital requirements 
under Pillar I, the BIS also provides requirements/expectations from the supervisory authorities 
for internal capital requirements which are mainly principle based under Pillar II (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013).   
 
3.1.3. Calculation of Business Unit Level Risk and Regulatory Capital 
We generate the risk and regulatory capital data for each business unit, as these are not 
disclosed at the business unit level in the consolidated financial statements. However, the 
financial statements do provide the asset value of each business unit. Thus, we derive risk and 
regulatory capital data using the relative asset volatility of each business unit compared to the 
                                                            
10 According to the Bank for International Settlement (BIS), January 2016 report, ES must be computed on a 
daily basis for the bank-wide internal model for regulatory capital purposes. The BIS demands that the ES must 
also be computed on a daily basis for each trading desk that a bank wishes to include within the scope for the 
internal model for regulatory capital purposes. 
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sum of all the business units’ asset volatility up to time t, measured by realized standard 
deviations. We multiply this by the total capital at time t, 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡  to calculate business unit i’s 
capital, 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 as shown in equation (8). 









× 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 = 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖                                          (8)                        
At,i is the asset value for business unit i at time t, N is the total number of business units, 
and m is the number of quarters. Similarly, we derive the risk capital for each business unit by 
multiplying the total capital by the risk ratio as given in equation (8) and call it as ‘Economic 
Capital regime’. The empirical results derived with the regulatory capital are reported under 
the title ‘Basel regime’.  In order to avoid excessive risk, our model ceases capital allocation if 
our Economic Capital amount (minimum required capital) exceeds the available total equity 
capital.  
 
3.2. How is the Capital Optimally Allocated? 
In practice, the firm’s headquarters chooses the capital allocation mechanism and elicits 
investment information from divisional managers to determine the optimal capital amount to 
be allocated to each division (Stoughton and Zechner, 2007). Nevertheless, banks have to 
consider meeting the minimum capital adequacy requirements as laid down in Basel II, III and 
the ICAAP. 
The required economic capital calculations may be affected as bank can choose 
between various risk measures such as standard deviation, VaR, ES and spectral or distorted 
risk measures. There are several criteria for selecting an appropriate risk measures. These 
include, intuitive, stable, easy to compute, easy to understand, coherent, simple and 
meaningful. Amongst the various risk measures, VaR and ES are the most widely used. While 
each of them has advantages and disadvantages, VaR is easier to understand than ES but does 
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not satisfy the coherence criteria. On the other hand, ES is coherent but relatively less easy to 
interpret than VaR, and its link with desired target credit is not clear (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2009). The Bank for International Settlement (BIS) proposed moving its 
standardized risk measure from VaR to ES in 2012 after identifying a number of deficiencies 
with VaR (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013). The spectral or distorted risk 
measure is effective in assigning different weights to the quantiles of loss distribution, which 
makes it more powerful than other risk measures. However, it is highly dependent on the 
underlying loss distribution, and its computation method is complicated to use and understand 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009, 2013). The BIS too advocates using ES. For 
these reasons, we use ES as the risk measure.  
In the context of RORAC, the Euler allocation principle which we use is considered as 
most appropriate (Tasche, 2008; Buch et al., 2011). It allocates capital according to the risk 
contributions of each business unit. The risk contributions are calculated using partial 
derivatives of the risk measure with respect to the capital of each business unit (Tasche, 2008). 
We empirically estimate the RORACs by using our model and compare these with the 
benchmark RORACs.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Preliminary Findings  
We begin by illustrating the empirical applicability of our theoretically derived model using 
data from Bank of America Corp. Table 1 presents results of capital allocation derived by using 
our model under both Basel+ and Economic Capital+ regimes. The results provide a comparison 
of RORAC obtained via our model vis-a-vis the benchmark with no capital allocation. The 
quarterly capital allocation begins in March 31, 2012 and finishes in December 31, 2014. The 
results show that RORAC with capital allocation using our model under both the Basel+ and 
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the Economic Capital+ regimes exceed the benchmark RORAC in almost all quarters except 
quarter 10 (September 30, 2013). The average RORAC using our model is significantly higher 
than the benchmark RORAC. This confirms that our model is able to enhance the efficiency of 
the capital allocation process. 
 
>> Insert Table 1<< 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the overall RORAC and the capital allocated to 
different business units. The red dotted and green dashed lines in Panel A represent the 
RORACs achieved through our model with enhancements. RORAC in red dotted line is 
calculated when we consider capital requirements as per the Basel regime. The RORAC in 
green dashed line is estimated when we consider economic capital. Panel A clearly shows that 
both red dotted and green dashed RORAC lines are above the blue solid line indicating that our 
model is able to enhance the RORAC consistently across all quarters, except for quarter 10.    
Panel A shows the changes in the overall RORAC are driven primarily by the changes 
in the expected overall net income shown in Panel B. Panels C and D demonstrate the quarterly 
capital allocation to various business units. In general, the pattern of capital allocation is similar 
under both Basel+ and Economic Capital+ regimes. We find the initial periods for capital 
allocation (e.g., approximately from quarter 4 to 8) show large capital shifts among divisions 
(Panel C and D) compared to the latter periods (e.g., from quarter 9 to 15). Specifically, our 
model significantly reduces capital to the Consumer Real Estate Services and All Other 
divisions and gives more capital to the Consumer & Business Banking, Global Banking and 
Global Markets divisions during the initial periods. After this large initial adjustment, the 
capital allocations among the divisions are relatively stable during the latter periods. Since the 
capital shifts during the latter allocation periods are not large, the overall RORAC evolution in 
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the latter periods resembles the benchmark RORAC (with no capital allocation). However, the 
RORAC achieved through optimal capital allocation using our model is higher.  
 
>> Insert Figure 1<< 
 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
We now extend our empirical analysis to all fourteen U.S. banks included in our sample. Table 
2 shows the descriptive statistics of banks in our sample. As our sample period is from June 
30, 2006 to December 31, 2014, it includes the introduction of Basel II and III. Panel A of the 
table shows average, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, total number of observations, 
total asset, total risk capital, regulatory capital and total net income of our sample banks. The 
average total assets for our sample banks are US$614,519m with average risk capital and 
regulatory capital of US$67,672m and US$65,448m respectively. The average total income is 
US$1,368m over the entire sample period. Panel B of the table shows total numbers of quarters 
available for estimation and total number of business units for each bank.  
 
>>Insert Table 2<< 
 
4.3. Capital Allocation Efficiency  
In Table 3, we report the results obtained by using our model. We include the ‘+’ superscript 
to our regime names when we include both debt effects and the Bayesian learning process in 
our model (i.e., Basel+ and Economic Capital+ regimes).  Panels A and B report results under 
the Basel regime whereas Panels C and D report results under the Economic Capital regime.   
 




In Panel A, we find that the average quarterly RORAC improves by 0.036 percentage 
points using our model with no enhancements. This demonstrates that our model improves the 
capital allocation efficiency even when we do not consider the debt and Bayesian learning 
effects. We report results with enhancements in Panel B. We find that the average quarterly 
RORAC increases by 0.305 percentage points.11 The results show that the RORAC is higher 
when we include the debt effects and the Bayesian learning process in our model.  
Panels C and D show empirical results when we use Economic Capital for capital 
allocation. Panel C shows that the average quarterly RORAC reduces by 0.017 percentage 
points without enhancements. However, Panel D shows that the average quarterly RORAC 
improves by 0.331 percentage points with enhancements12 indicating that the debt effect and 
the Bayesian learning process do indeed improve the capital allocation efficiency. Overall, we 
find capital allocation using our model increases the average RORAC with the enhancements 
under both Basel and Economic Capital regimes.13 
Using our model, the difference between the enhanced RORAC and the observed 
RORAC is approximately 0.3 percentage points (i.e., 0.305 and 0.331 percentage points per 
quarter under Basel+ and Economic Capital+ regimes, respectively in Table 3). In other words, 
                                                            
11 We have five exceptional cases, BB&T Corp, Comerica Inc., KeyCorp, People’s United Financial Inc. and 
Wells Fargo & Co., where average RORAC after allocation is lower. 
12 There are again same five cases, BB&T Corp, Comerica Inc., KeyCorp, People’s United Financial Inc. and 
Wells Fargo & Co., where the RORAC is lower than the benchmark. 
13 Although our model, on average improves the overall RORAC of the banks in our sample, some banks show a 
slight decline in the RORAC. This may be because our sample period includes the global financial crisis that 
began with severe problems in the US subprime mortgage market in 2007 and which eventually resulted in the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. During this period, many American banks experienced financial difficulties 
that may have affected their ROCs. 
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this implies that the capital allocation using our model generates additional 0.3 percentage point 
returns per quarter. The median capital level of our sample banks is approximately 
US$20,000m, (i.e., US$19,414m and US$22,251m regulatory and risk capitals, respectively). 
This suggests that banks could benefit to the extent of US$60m quarterly (0.3 percentage points 
of US$20,000m) through more efficient capital allocation using our model. 
 
4.4. Capital Allocation Efficiency and Bank Size  
The extant literature provides evidence that larger banks benefit from economies of scale 
(Altunbas et al., 2007; Abedifar et al., 2013). Further, Tran et al. (2016) suggest that small 
banks’ profitability tends to be more capital dependent compared to the large banks that are 
more likely to engage in off-balance sheet or fee-based activities. Therefore, we test how the 
bank size affects the RORAC.  
We take categorize banks into large and small banks based on whether the average total 
assets of the bank is above or below the median of the total assets of all banks in our sample. 
Table 4 presents the results of RORAC improvements based on size under both Basel+ and 
Economic Capital+ regimes. We find that large size banks experience higher RORAC 
improvements on average compared to smaller banks. These results appear to be consistent 
with the previous studies discussed above.  
 
>>Insert Table 4<< 
 
5. Conclusions 
We introduce a new capital allocation model for banks by extending Buch et al.’s (2011) model. 
We develop a multi-period model allowing for the time-varying risk and expected profit. Under 
dynamic financial conditions, we derive a closed-form solution for the optimal capital 
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allocation to different business units with an aim to maximize overall RORAC. We impose 
capital constraints by not allowing external capital input. Further, our model includes two 
additional enhancements − debt effect and the Bayesian learning process. The debt effect 
overcomes distortions caused by excessive debt at business unit level and the Bayesian learning 
process help reduce the forecasting error arising from information asymmetry between the 
‘belief’ and ‘actual’ profit.  
This is the first study to provide empirical evidence of the effects of internal capital 
allocation on the RORAC. We use data of fourteen banks listed in S&P 500 index. We 
maximize RORAC while ensuring that both the required regulatory and risk capital 
requirements are satisfied. Our findings show that the average quarterly RORAC improves by 
0.305 percentage points under the Basel+ regime and by 0.331 percentage points under the 
Economic Capital+ regime compared to the benchmark. We also find that larger banks with 
above median size of total assets show greater improvements in the RORAC.  
The findings reported in the paper have several implications. First, given the scarcity 
of capital, banks can and indeed do benefit by optimizing internal capital allocation. Second, 
though most of our sample banks initially show relatively large capital shifts among divisions, 
the changes in the latter period are smaller indicating the Bayesian learning process has an 
influence on the optimal capital allocation process. Finally, the model shows that banks can 
achieve consistently higher RORAC by allocating capital to more profitable divisions that do 
not significantly increase the overall risk.  
However, the findings reported in the paper should be interpreted with caution. Our 
model assumes normally distributed returns and may therefore under or overestimate risk. 
Further, the internal capital allocation process itself can incur costs and may increase capital 
charge, thus affecting the risk taking behavior of the divisional managers. Finally, in the real 
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world, decision to close a business unit not may not be dependent entirely on RORAC 
maximization criterion.  
 
Acknowledgements 
We are grateful for valuable comments and suggestions of the two anonymous referees and the 
associate editor, which enormously helped in improving the quality of the paper. We would 
like to thank Vineet Agarwal for his help and advice on the earlier drafts of the paper.  We are 
also thankful for the comments and suggestions received from Allen Berger and Natalya 
Schenck, in the 2016 Southern Finance Association conference and Blake Rayfield at the 2017 
Eastern Finance Association Annual Meetings. This research did not receive any specific grant 



















Abedifar, P., Molyneux, P. and Tarazi, A. (2013) Risk in Islamic banking, Review of Finance, 
17 (6), pp 2035–2096. 
Acerbi, C. and Tasche, D. (2002) On the coherence of ES, Journal of Banking and Finance, 
26(7), pp 1487–1503. 
Alessandri, P. and Drehmann, M. (2010) An economic capital model integrating credit and 
interest rate risk in the banking book, Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(2), pp 730–742. 
Altunbas, Y., Carbo, S., Gardner, E. and Molyneux, P. (2007) Examining the relationship 
between capital, risk and efficiency in European banking, European Financial Management, 
13 (1), pp 49–70. 
Artzner, P., Delbaen, F., Eber, J.M., Heath, D. (1999) Coherent measures of risk. Mathematical 
Finance, 9(3), pp 203–228. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (1988) International convergence of capital 
measurement and capital standards (updated to April 1998). Basel, Switzerland: Bank for 
International Settlement. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2009) Strengthening the resilience of the banking 
sector—Consultative document, Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlement. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2010a) Basel III: International framework for 




Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2010b) Basel III: A global regulatory framework 
for more resilient banks and banking systems, Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International 
Settlement. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2013) Fundamental review of the trading book: A 
revised market risk framework, Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlement. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2015) A brief history of the Basel Committee. Basel, 
Switzerland: Bank for International Settlement. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2016) Minimum capital requirements for market 
risk, Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlement. 
Breuer, T., Jandačka, M., Rheinberger, K. and Summer, M. (2010) Does adding up of economic 
capital for market- and credit risk amount to conservative risk assessment? Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 34(4), pp. 703–712. 
Buch, A., Dorfleitner, G. and Wimmer, M. (2011) Risk capital allocation for RORAC 
optimization, Journal of Banking and Finance, 35(11), pp 3001–3009.  
Cvitanić, J. and Zapatero, F. (2004) Introduction to the Economics and Mathematics of 
Financial Markets, USA, MIT Press, pp 140–141. 
Denault, M. (2001) Coherent allocation of risk capital, Journal of Risk, 4(1), pp 1–34. 
Dhaene, J., Tsanakas, A., Valdez, E.A. and Vanduffel, S. (2012) Optimal Capital Allocation 
Principles, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 79 (1), pp 1–28.  
Embrechts, P., Furrer, H. and Kaufmann, R. (2003) Quantifying regulatory capital for 
operational risk, Derivatives Use, Trading & Regulation, 9(3), pp. 217–233. 
26 
 
Erel, I., Myers, S.C., and Read Jr., J.A. (2015) A theory of risk capital, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 118(3), pp 620–635. 
Furman, E., Zitikis, R. (2008) Weighted risk capital allocations. Insurance: Mathematics and 
Economics, 43(2),  pp 263–270. 
Gründl, H., Schmeiser, H. (2007) Capital allocation for insurance companies—what good is 
it? Journal of Risk and Insurance, 74(2), pp 301–317. 
Kalkbrener, M. (2005) An axiomatic approach to capital allocation, Mathematical Finance, 
15(3), pp 425–437. 
Kim, J., and Hardy, M. (2009) A capital allocation based on a solvency exchange option, 
Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 44(3), pp 357–366. 
Kudryavtsev, L.D. (2002) Homogeneous function, Encyclopedia of mathematics, Springer: 
Berlin. 
Lönnbark, C. (2013) On the role of the estimation error in prediction of expected shortfall, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 37(3), pp 847–853. 
Merton, R.C., Perold, A.F. (1993) Theory of risk capital in financial firms, Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance, 6(3), pp 16–32. 
Myers, S.C. and Read, J.A. (2001) Capital allocation for insurance companies, Journal of Risk 
and Insurance, pp 545–580. 
Perold, A.F. (2005) Capital allocation in financial firms. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
17(3), pp 110–118. 
27 
 
Rosen, D. and Saunders, D. (2010) Risk factor contributions in portfolio credit risk models, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(2), pp 336–349. 
Sherris, M. (2006) Solvency, capital allocation and fair rate of return in insurance, Journal of 
Risk and Insurance, 73(1), pp 71–96. 
Stoughton, N.M. and Zechner, J. (2007) Optimal capital allocation using RAROCTM and 
EVA®, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 16 (3), pp 312–342.  
Tasche, D. (2004) Allocating Portfolio Economic Capital to Sub-Portfolios. Economic Capital: 
A Practitionerʼs Guide, Risk Books. pp 1–20.  
Tasche, D. (2008) Capital allocation to business units and sub-portfolios: the Euler principle. 
In: Resti, A. (Ed.), Pillar II in the New Basel Accord: The Challenge of Economic Capital. Risk 
Books. London, pp 423–453. 
Tran, V.T., Lin, C-T. and Nguyen, H. (2016) Liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank 
profitability, International Review of Financial Analysis, 48, pp 98–109. 
Wernz, J. (2014) Bank management and control: Strategy, capital and risk management. 
Germany, Springer.  
Zaik, E., Walter, J., Kelling, G. and James, C. (1996) RAROC at Bank of America: from theory 







Table 1. Comparison of Results under Our Model using Bank of America Corp. 
This table shows the our model’s results using Bank of America Corp. for its overall RORAC 
and expected net income with no allocation (i.e. the benchmark), with allocation under the 
Basel+ regime and with allocation under the Economic Capital+ regime. The last two columns 
show the total available regulatory capital and risk capital amount that do not change during 
allocation, while we use only the available regulatory capital in our overall RORAC formula 
for the purpose of comparison. The capital allocation starts from March 31, 2012. The units for 














–Economic Capital+ regime 
 
    
2011-06-30    
2011-09-30    
2011-12-31 0.93% 0.93% 0.93% 
2012-03-31 0.31% 2.34% 2.10% 
2012-06-30 1.18% 2.09% 2.08% 
2012-09-30 0.17% 1.82% 1.78% 
2012-12-31 0.37% 1.37% 1.28% 
2013-03-31 0.74% 2.15% 2.03% 
2013-06-30 2.04% 3.04% 3.01% 
2013-09-30 1.26% 1.32% 1.23% 
2013-12-31 1.72% 2.32% 2.25% 
2014-03-31 -0.15% 0.65% 0.37% 
2014-06-30 1.16% 2.86% 2.78% 
2014-09-30 -0.12% 1.02% 0.84% 
2014-12-31 1.89% 3.22% 3.21% 
Average 0.88% 2.02% 1.91% 
 
 










Figure 1. Preliminary Findings using Bank of America Corp. 
These figures show the overall RORAC, expected net income, and business units’ new capital 
(i.e. risk or regulatory capital) after allocation using our model for Bank of America Corp. We 
compare these with the benchmark with no capital allocation against the Basel+ and Economic 
Capital+ regimes in terms of overall RORAC (Panel A), expected net income (Panel B), and 
change in business units’ regulatory or risk capital input (Panel C and D). There are four 
business units and the allocation starts at time 4 (fourth quarter or on March 31, 2012) until 
time 15 (the 15th quarter or on December 31, 2014). All units other than the overall RORAC 


























Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the data used. Panel A shows the average, 
minimum, maximum, standard deviation (i.e. Std.), and total count (i.e. N) of the total asset, 
total risk capital, regulatory capital (i.e. risk-based capital) and total net income. The units for 
the financial variables (total asset, total risk capital, total regulatory capital, and total net 
income) are in million US dollars. The dates are quarterly from December 31, 2006 to 
December 31, 2014. Panel B shows each bank’s name, total quarters of estimation, and total 
number of business units used in the empirical test. 
 
Panel A. Financial Data 
 Total Asset ($M) Total Risk Capital ($M) 
Regulatory Capital 
($M) 
Total Net Income 
($M) 
Average 614518.60 67671.79 65448.18 1367.86 
Min 30400.10 4568.40 3133.30 -1928.00 
Max 2573126.00 243471.00 215101.00 6061.00 
Std. 742823.04 77852.43 70839.15 1686.17 
N 223 223 223 223 
 
 
Panel B. Banks’ Characteristics 
Banks Total Quarters of Estimation 
Total Number of Business 
Units 
Bank of America Corp 13 5 
BB&T Corp 9 7 
Citigroup Inc. 20 3 
Comerica Inc. 23 5 
Fifth Third Bancorp 14 4 
Huntington Bancshares Inc./OH 15 4 
JPMorgan Chase & Co 6 5 
KeyCorp 20 3 
People's United Financial Inc. 5 3 
PNC Financial Services Group Inc. 21 5 
Regions Financial Corp 5 3 
SunTrust Banks Inc. 9 4 
US Bancorp/MN 30 5 












Table 3. Empirical Results 
These tables show the empirical results of our model using fourteen U.S. banks listed in the 
S&P 500 index. We compare the benchmark RORAC without using our model and the 
optimized RORAC using our model for each bank under four different regimes—the Basel 
(Panel A), Basel+ (Panel B), Economic Capital (Panel C), and Economic Capital+ (Panel D) 
regimes. We show the benchmark quarterly average RORAC, our model’s quarterly average 
RORAC, average improvement per quarter, and total quarters of estimation.  
 





























Bank of America 
Corp 
 
0.881% 1.562% 0.681% 12 2.019% 1.138% 12 
BB&T Corp 
 2.465% 2.001% -0.464% 8 1.957% -0.509% 8 
Citigroup Inc. 
 1.706% 1.670% -0.036% 19 2.112% 0.407% 19 
Comerica Inc. 













2.620% 2.194% -0.427% 5 3.043% 0.422% 5 
KeyCorp 

















2.161% 3.381% 1.220% 8 3.881% 1.720% 8 
US Bancorp/MN 
 3.088% 3.243% 0.155% 29 3.252% 0.163% 29 
Wells Fargo & 
Co 2.927% 2.804% -0.123% 32 2.908% -0.019% 32 





Improvement = Our Model’s RORAC - Benchmark RORAC 
Benchmark: Overall RORAC without risk capital allocation under the Basel regime 




































Bank of America 
Corp 
 
0.881% 1.402% 0.521% 12 1.913% 1.033% 12 
BB&T Corp 
 2.465% 2.001% -0.465% 8 2.264% -0.201% 8 
Citigroup Inc. 
 1.706% 1.914% 0.209% 19 2.242% 0.536% 19 
Comerica Inc. 













2.620% 2.183% -0.437% 5 3.034% 0.414% 5 
KeyCorp 

















2.161% 3.378% 1.217% 8 3.882% 1.721% 8 
US Bancorp/MN 
 3.088% 3.295% 0.207% 29 3.294% 0.205% 29 
Wells Fargo & 
Co 2.927% 2.804% -0.123% 32 2.903% -0.024% 32 
Average 2.093% 2.076% -0.017% 14.93 2.424% 0.331% 14.93 
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Table 4. Empirical Results of Different Firm Size 
The following tables show the average RORAC levels with capital allocation under the Basel+ 
and the Economic Capital+ regimes. We classify the average RORAC with capital allocation 













JPMorgan Chase & Co 2495967.833 0.422% 0.414% 
Bank of America Corp 2165895.231 1.138% 1.033% 
Citigroup Inc 1621407.950 0.407% 0.536% 
Wells Fargo & Co  1172933.333 -0.019% -0.024% 
US Bancorp/MN 305364.100 0.163% 0.205% 
Average 1552313.689 0.422% 0.433% 
Small 
PNC Financial Services Group 
Inc 198832.714 0.062% 0.058% 
BB&T Corp 184222.556 -0.509% -0.201% 
SunTrust Banks Inc 174251.222 1.720% 1.721% 
Fifth Third Bancorp 131673.429 0.112% 0.144% 
Regions Financial Corp 84293.400 0.988% 0.985% 
KeyCorp 83584.550 -0.157% -0.159% 
Comerica Inc. 61291.640 -0.048% -0.116% 
Huntington Bancshares Inc/OH 47238.710 0.100% 0.136% 
People's United Financial Inc 32406.960 -0.112% -0.105% 





Appendix. Proofs and Illustrations 
 
Illustration of Definition 2.1. We calculate the conditional covariance σ𝑡𝑡cov of return on capital 
(ROC) among N divisions at time t, which is conditional on the past covariance as follows:  




�                                             (A.1)                                  
where division index i ranges from 1 to N.  
This one-step-ahead ES function satisfies all four coherent risk measure properties for the 
Euler allocation used in our model (Acerbi and Tasche, 2002).14 Thus, the Economic Capital, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 
at time t, is calculated by multiplying our one-step ahead ES by the total asset of the bank ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 , 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the total asset of division i at time t. 




Proof of Lemma 2.3. We assume the time-varying expected profit process follows a Stochastic 
Differential Equation (SDE):15 
                                                            
14 Following Artzner et al. (1999), when X and Y are portfolios and ρ is the coherent risk measure, then it satisfies the 
following properties. 
• Monotonicity: for all X and Y, if X ≤ Y, I have ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y). 
• Subadditivity: for all and, ρ(X+Y) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y) 
• Positive homogeneity: for all λ ≥ 0 and all X, ρ(λ X) = λ ρ(X).  
• Translation invariance: for all X and all real numbers α, if A is a portfolio with guaranteed return α, I have 
ρ(X+A) = ρ(X) – α  
15 This SDE is a time-varying version of the stochastic profit process used by Buch et al. (2011). 
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                                          (A.3)                        
The profit for business unit i at time t is its expected profit plus profit fluctuations, where both the 
drift 𝜇𝜇 and the diffusion 𝜎𝜎 are time varying. 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 is the standard Wiener process. All business units 
within a firm follow this SDE process. We then discretize the SDE process from time t-dt to t as 
follows:            
    
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡] = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡] + 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡]𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡
⇒ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡] − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡]
                    = �𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡�� + �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 − 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡�𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡�
         (A.4) 
Here, dt is the minimum time step of the data.  
The profit 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡] is a function of capital 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 and return on capital at time t (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡), i.e.     
    
⇔ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡]
= 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡]
     +(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡) − (𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡]𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 − 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡]𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)
           (A.5) 
Since the expected value of the Weiner process is zero by definition, in expectation form, equation 
(A.5) becomes:  
              E �𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�� = 𝐸𝐸[𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡� + �𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡�]              (A.6) 
  ⇔ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡] = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡] + (𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)                                
We express this equation (A.6) in terms of capital weights 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤    
              𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 �                                                                                                                        (A.7) 





The overall RORAC 𝑟𝑟[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤] is defined as follows: 







 ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 ×𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡
𝑤𝑤�
                                      (A.8) 
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Since we use the absolute risk measure, our overall RORAC calculation does not subtract the 
expected profit from the risk in the denominator as in Buch et al. (2011).  
However, similar to Buch et al. (2011), we use the Euler optimization method to derive the 
additional capital allocation to business unit i such that its marginal RORAC after allocation equals 
the overall RORAC before allocation. However, we use capital weights rather than the capital. 
                                𝑟𝑟[𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 |𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 ]�����
          marginal RORAC




                                       (A.9) 
The unknown variable to solve from this equation 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  is the additional optimal capital weight for 
business unit i at time t. 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  is the existing capital weight for the business unit i at time t. 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 is the 
total capital weight equal to one.  
We define the marginal RORAC 𝑟𝑟[𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 |𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 ] as follows: 







𝑤𝑤 �−∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 ×𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑤𝑤 ]
                               (A.10)        
We simplify the numerator of equation (A.10) using equation (A.7) and with additional capital 
weight 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  as follows: 
       𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 � − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 �                                                   (A.11) 
        = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡� + �∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 × (𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 ) × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 × 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡� 
            − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡� + �∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 × 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 × 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡�       
       = ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 × 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                                                                      
We then simplify the denominator of equation (A.10) by subtracting the Taylor expansion forms 
for 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 � and 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 ]. We first describe 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 ] as a general expansion form.  
𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 � = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 � + 𝑎𝑎2�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 �
2
+ 𝑎𝑎3�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 �
3 ⋯ 
𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 � = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
2+ 𝑎𝑎3𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
3 + ⋯ 
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→ 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 � − 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 � = 𝑑𝑑𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 � = 𝑎𝑎1𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 𝑎𝑎2𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
2 + ⋯ 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 = 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  
→ 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 � − 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 � = 𝑑𝑑𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 � = 𝑎𝑎1𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
2 + ⋯ 
𝑑𝑑(𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 � − 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 �)
𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
= 𝑎𝑎1 + 2𝑎𝑎2𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 3𝑎𝑎3𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
2 + ⋯ 
𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑(𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 � − 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 �)
𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
= 2𝑎𝑎2 + 6𝑎𝑎3𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 + ⋯ 
The first two terms of the Taylor expansion subtraction form are as follows: 














𝑤𝑤                       (A.12)                            



















𝑤𝑤                      (A.13)              
We retain only the first two terms from the Taylor expansion subtraction form as follows:  











2                         (A.14)  
Since we only use the first two terms of the Taylor expansion, equation (A.14) is subject to an 
approximation error given by:  
                                          f [𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 ]- 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 [𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 ] =
𝑓𝑓(𝑛𝑛+1)(𝑐𝑐)
(𝑛𝑛+1)!
(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 )𝑛𝑛+1                                               (A.15) 
where f [𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 ] is the actual value, 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛[𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 ] is the estimated value from equation (A.14) and n is the 
degree of polynomial, which in our case is two. c in equation (A.15) is an arbitrary value that should 








𝑤𝑤  in 
equation (A.13) is the Hessian matrix with the business units’ weights. Following Buch et al. 
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(2011), we use the highest eigenvalue Λ𝑡𝑡 of this Hessian matrix, since it provides the maximum 
directional strength among the business units with the additional allocation input.          
We then combine equations (A.11) and (A.14) in (A.10) to derive the expression for 
marginal RORAC with capital allocation. 

















∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 ×(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑤𝑤+12Λ𝑡𝑡𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑤𝑤 2)
        (A.16) 
We then equate the overall RORAC (A.8) and the marginal RORAC with capital allocation (A.16) 
and solve for the 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  
                                             
∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 ×𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑤𝑤×𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡






 ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 ×𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡
𝑤𝑤�
                                     




                                                      (A.17)              
We account for the Taylor approximation error by choosing 0.5𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  instead of 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  as the value for 
c in equation (A.15). Hence, we have the expression for 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 : 




                                                           (A.18) 
 
Illustration of Definition 2.4 using Capital Constraints. We optimize a firm’s return-to-risk by 
reallocating the existing capital amount with no additional capital input. To achieve this, we ensure 
that no change is made in the total capital amount by making the sum of additional capital weights 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤  add up to zero. This is equivalent to making the new total capital weight 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1𝑤𝑤  add up to 
one all the time. We provide a minimum constraint so that a business unit’s capital weight does 
not fall below zero and new capital weights are greater than or equal to zero. We set the minimum 
threshold value to zero to avoid negative capital weight.  
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                                            𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1𝑤𝑤 = Max( 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1𝑤𝑤 , 0)                                            (A.19) 
Through this process, in equation (A.19), there are business units which have either zero or non-
zero capital weight. If there are any business units that did not have zero weight before but turned 
out to have zero weight in equation (A.19), then the total sum of weights in equation (A.19) 
exceeds one. In this case, we renormalize the capital weights such that for a business unit i, the 






. Then we compare this with zero and select a larger 
value. This process is shown in equation (A.20): 






, 0 )                                  (A.20) 
We then re-inject a business units’ capital weights from equation (A.20) back into equation (A.18) 
and (A.19) and re-estimate capital weights. If there are any business units that have zero weight, 
than our model allocates capital to other business units which have non-zero weights. We continue 
re-injecting until all business units’ capital weights are identical using equations (A.19) and (A.20) 
and capital weights from equations (A.19) and (A.20) must add up to one simultaneously. When 
we reach this stage, the model achieves the optimal point and business units’ capital weights add 
up to one. This enables our model to optimally allocate original capital and avoid injection of new 
capital.  
 
Proof of Lemma 2.5. In our model, the belief is updated overtime through an accumulating 
learning process. Following Cvitanić et al. (2004, pp. 140–141), we develop the following SDE 
model: 
                                                  
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡
𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 = 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 + ∫ (𝜇𝜇𝑢𝑢
𝑡𝑡
0 − 𝜇𝜇𝑢𝑢)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢, (𝑢𝑢 ≤ 𝑡𝑡)
                                   (A.21)            
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 is the stochastic profit process we use in our model that has time-varying drift 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 and time-
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varying diffusion 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡.  𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 is the expected profit before capital allocation at time t.  𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 is the ‘belief’ 
of the expected profit after capital allocation at time t. We start by inputting the innovation process 
𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 into the following stochastic profit process. 
                                     
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡cov𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡
⇔ 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡cov(𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 + ∫ (𝜇𝜇𝑢𝑢
𝑡𝑡
0 − 𝜇𝜇𝑢𝑢)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢)
                            (A.22)  
We use the square root of weighted realized covariance portion �𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 × σ𝑡𝑡cov × 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
ʹ of the ES risk 
measure 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 in section 2.1.1 for our diffusion process  𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡cov in equation (A.22). We then express 
𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 − 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 using the same procedure as in equation (A.11). 
                             
𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 − 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡
= 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡] − 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡]
= 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡] + (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 − 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)
−𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡] + ((𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 − 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)
= (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡) − (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡
                       (A.23) 
Substituting equation (A.23) into equation (A.22): 
                            
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 +  𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡(𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 + ∫ (𝜇𝜇𝑢𝑢
𝑡𝑡
0 − 𝜇𝜇𝑢𝑢)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢)
= 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 +  𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 +  𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 ∫ (
𝑡𝑡
0 (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡) − (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
                   (A.24) 
We take the expected value on both sides of equation (A.24) to derive the expected profit with the 
Bayesian learning process: 
  𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡] = 𝐸𝐸[𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 +  𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 +  𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 ∫ (
𝑡𝑡
0 (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡) − (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢]                 (A.25) 
  𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡,𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛                                       
               = 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 +  𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 ∫ (
𝑡𝑡
0 (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡) − (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢 
               = 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 +  𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 ∫ (
𝑡𝑡
0 (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡) − (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡) × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢 




𝑖𝑖=1 × 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡� − (∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ×𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡))𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢 
               = 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 +  𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 ∫ ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 (
𝑡𝑡
0 (𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑤𝑤 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡) − (𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡))𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢                     (A.26) 
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We reflect this in our time-varying risk measure in equation (1).  
                                                              𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤] − 
𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡,𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 
𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡
                                                                  (A.27) 
The 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡,𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 is divided by the total capital weight 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 to have the consistent percentage term as 
our time-varying risk measure expression 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤].   
Since we are considering our time-varying risk measure to be an absolute risk measure which has 
the expected profit portion 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡  to be zero, we are only left with the remaining part 
 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 ∫ ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 (
𝑡𝑡
0 (𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑤𝑤 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡) − (𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡))𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢  to use in our time-varying risk 
measure. Then the equation A.27 becomes: 
                        𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤] −






                                            
              ⟺ 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤] −  𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 ∫ ∑ ((𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡−𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡) − (𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡))𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
𝑡𝑡
0                     (A.28)                        
 
We reflect this in equation A.28 in our closed-form solution in equation A.18 which becomes the 
following. 
                         𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 =
−𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡[𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡






                  (A.29) 
 
